1 we introduce a distortion free watermarking technique that strengthen the verification of integrity of the relational databases by using a public zero distortion authentication mechanism based on the Abstract Interpretation framework.
Introduction
Watermarking is a widely used technique to embed additional but not visible information into the underlying data with the aim of supporting tamper detection, localization, ownership proof, and/or traitor tracing purposes. Watermarking techniques apply to various types of host content. Digital multimedia watermarking technology was suggested in the last decade to embed copyright information in digital objects such images, audio and video. Most watermarking research concentrated on watermarking multimedia data objects such as still images [7] and video [1] , [2] , [3] and audio [4] , [5] , [6] . However, the increasing use of relational database systems in many real-life applications created an ever increasing need for watermarking database systems. As a result, watermarking relational database systems is now merging as a research area that deals with the legal issue of copyright protection of database systems. Techniques developed for multimedia data cannot be directly used for watermarking relational databases, because relational and multimedia data differ in a number of important respects [8] .
Unlike encryption and hash description, typical watermarking techniques modify the ordinal data and inevitably cause permanent distortion to the original ones and this is an issue when integrity requirement of data are required. However some applications in which relational data are involved cannot tolerate any permanent distortions and data's integrity needs to be authenticated. In this paper we further strengthen this approach by refining the distortion free watermarking algorithm [9] for relational databases and discuss it in abstract interpretation framework proposed by Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot [10] , [11] , [12] .
In Section 2, the basic database watermarking process is described along with the most relevant existing database watermarking techniques. In Section 3 we introduce the formal definitions and mathematical notations that we are going to use in the remaining sections. The actual watermarking process is introduced in Section 4. We illustrate database authentication issues in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the algorithm to handle different watermarking attacks. In Section 7, we conclude by discussing the main advantages of our scheme.
Basic Watermarking Process
The motivation for database watermarking is to protect databases, especially those published online as parametric specifications, surveys or life sciences biometric data, from tampering and pirated copies. Database watermarking consists of two basic processes: watermark insertion and watermark detection, as illustrated in Figure 1 . For watermark insertion, a key is used to embed watermark information into an original database so as to produce the watermarked database for publication or distribution. Given appropriate key and watermark information, a watermark detection process can be applied to any suspicious database so as to determine whether or not a legitimate watermark can be detected. A suspicious database can be any watermarked database or innocent database, or a mixture of them under various database attacks. The first well-known database watermarking scheme was proposed by Agrawal and Kiernan [8] for watermarking numerical values in relational databases. Agrawal and Kiernans scheme has been extended by Ng and Lau to watermark XML data [13] . This scheme is further extended and deployed on a XML compression system. In [14] Gross-Amblard introduce interesting theoretical results investigating alterations to relational data in a consumer-driven framework in which a set of parametric queries are to be preserved up to an acceptable level of distortion. Agrawal and Kiernan's scheme cannot be directly applied to watermarking categorical data. To solve this problem, Sion [25] proposed to watermark a categorical attribute by changing some of its values to other values of the attribute if such change is tolerable in certain applications. In [15] , Li, Guo, and Jajodia introduced a distortion-free scheme for watermarking categorical data. Guo et al. [16] proposed another fragile watermarking scheme that can further improve the precision in tamper localization, assuming that the database relation to be watermarked has numerical attributes and that the errors introduced in two least significant bits of each value can be tolerated. Recent works and surveys can be found in [23] , [24] .
Preliminaries
We shall use the capital letters at the beginning of the alphabet to denote single attributes (A, B...) , and dom(A) will be the domain of the attribute A. For sets of attributes we shall use the letters at the end of the alphabet (X, Y...), and dom(X) will be the cartesian product of all the attribute domains A ∈ X. R, S... will denote relational schemes (sets of attributes). A(R) is a set of attributes and T (R) is the set of tuples, over which relation schema R is defined. Relations, i.e, instances of relational schemes, will be denoted by small letters such as r, s... and tuples by t, u.... To emphasize that the attribute A belongs to the relation r, we shall use the notation r.A. The value of an attribute A in a tuple t, will be represented by t [A] . A relational table R is a function,
The symbol × stands for the usual cartesian product. 
Example 1. Consider the EMPLOYEE
′ ∈ ℘(T (R ′ ) × A(R ′ ))\R is negligible.
Definition 2. (Partial order)
A binary relation ⊑ on a set C is a partial order on C if the following properties hold: Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the Galois connection features.
Distortion Free Database Watermarking
Specifying only allowable change limits on individual values, and possibly an overall limit, fails to capture important semantic features associated with the data, especially if data are structured. Consider for example, the age data in an Indian context. While a small change to the age values may be acceptable, it may be critical that individuals that are younger than 21 remain so even after watermarking if the data will be used to determine behavior patterns for underage drinking. Similarly, if the same data were to be used for identifying legal voters, the cut-off would be 18 years. In another scenario, if a relation contains
Fig. 2. Galois connection
the start and end times of a web interaction, it is important that each tuple satisfies the condition that the end time be later than the start time. For some other application it may be important that the relative ages, in terms of which one is younger, do not change. It is clear from the above examples, that simple bounds on the change of numerical values are often not sufficient to prevent side effects of a watermarking insertion. Our proposed watermarking technique is partition based. The partitioning can be seen as a virtual grouping, which neither change the value of the table's elements nor their physical positions. This partitioning phase is interpreted in abstract interpretation framework as relational table abstraction. Instead of inserting the watermark directly to the database partition, we treat it as an abstract representation of that concrete partition, such that any change in the concrete domain reflects in its abstract counterpart. This is called partition abstracting. The main idea is to generate a image (binary [9] or grey scale [17] ) of the partition as a watermark of that partition, that serves as ownership proof (certificate) as well as tamper detection, namely authentication phase. The overall scheme is depicted in Figure 3 .
Partitioning
In this section we will describe three partitioning algorithms. We recall the first two forms [22] , [9] and [17] , respectively. Here, we propose a new one based on pattern tabaleau, and describe the abstraction associated with each partitioning scheme.
Partition Based on Categorical Attribute Let R be a given relational data table and C ∈ A(R) be a categorical attribute. The (finite) value set V ⊆ dom(C) is the set of values of C that are actually present in R. We can partition the tuples in R by grouping the values of attribute C [22] as 
The frequency q i of v i is the number of tuples in
So the entire database can be partitioned into N fixed mutual exclusive areas based on each categorical value v i .
Abstraction Given a relation R a categorical attribute C ∈ A(R) and P
The best representation of a set of tuples with attribute C is captured by the corresponding abstraction function α x :
We may prove that (α x , γ x ) form a Galois insertion with α x monotone and , m) ).
Secret Partitioning
The second partitioning algorithm [9] , [17] , partitions the relational data table based on a secret key ℜ with P as the primary key attribute and N is the number of tuples in R. R is partitioned into m non overlapping partitions, [ 
In order to generate the partitions, for each tuple r ∈ T (R), the data partitioning algorithm computes a message authenticated code (MAC) using HMAC [18] .
Using the property that secure hash functions generate uniformly distributed message digests, this partitioning technique places ( N m ) tuples, on average, in each partition. Furthermore, an attacker cannot predict the tuples-to-partition assignment without the knowledge of the secret key ℜ and the number of partitions m which are kept secret. Keeping it secret makes it harder for the attacker to regenerate the partitions. The partitioning algorithm is reported in Table 2 . Abstraction Given R and m partitions {[S i ], 0 ≤ i ≤ (m − 1)}, for each set T ⊆ R, and given a set of natural number i ∈ N, we can define a concretization map γ as follows:
The best representation of a set of tuples is captured by the corresponding abstraction function α :
The main advantage of this partitioning is that, it is not limited to any particular type of attribute, like categorical or numerical attribute.
Partitioning Based on Pattern Tableau Using the intersection operator over tuples we could build the tuples lattice of a relation. A closed tuple will thus subsume all tuples agreeing on the same values, i.e. the values of non empty variables in the closed tuple. This notion of set of tuples agreeing on the same values for a given set of attributes X has already been defined in database theory for horizontal decomposition purposes [20] . Let us consider the following definitions to define the partitioning.
Definition 5. (Pattern tableau) A pattern tableau R # with all attributes from A(R), where each row t p ∈ T (R # ) and each attribute A ∈ A(R), t p [A] is either: -a constant a ∈ dom(A). -an empty variable ⊤ which indicates that the attribute does not contribute to the pattern.

Definition 6. (X-complete property) The relation r is said to be X-complete if and only if ∀t
Informally, a relation is X-complete if all tuples agree on the attributes X.
Definition 7. (X-complete-pattern) We call X-complete-pattern of an X-complete relation r, denoted by P(X, r), the pattern tuple on which tuples of r agree.
Since r is X-complete, its X-complete-pattern defines at least the attributes in X, i.e. those attributes do not have the ⊤ value. Table 3 ,
Definition 8. (X-complete horizontal decomposition) The set of all X-complete fragment relations of r, R X (r) is defined formally as
R X (r) = {r ′ ⊆ r|r is X − complete}.
Definition 9. (Set of X-patterns) The set of all X-complete-patterns of an Xcomplete decomposition, Γ (X, r) is formally defined as
Γ (X, r) = {P(X, r ′ )|r ′ ∈ R X (r)}.
Example 2. Consider
T A B C D E F t1 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 t2 a1 b1 c1 d1 e2 f1 t3 a2 b1 c2 d2 e2 f1 t4 a2 b1 c2 d2 e3 f1 t5 a2 b2 c2 d2 e1 f2 t6 a2 b2 c2 d1 e1 f2 t7 a2 b2 c1 d1 e1 f2 t8 a2 b2 c1 d2 e1 f2 t9 a1 b2 c2 d1 e2 f2 t10 a1 b2 c2 d1 e1 f2 Table 3 . An instance relation r of the schema R Partitions are the X−complete horizontal decomposition of R, R X (R), where X ⊆ A, such that the following two conditions must be satisfied,
Abstraction Given a relation R and m partitions (X − complete horizontal decompositions of R) {[R
and given a set of X − complete patterns, we can define a concretization map γ as follows:
r), ∀a ∈ A : either t(a) = P(X, r)(a) or P(X, r)(a) = ⊤ ∅ Otherwise
Example 3. Table 4 shows the concrete relation instance r and associated abstract relation instance r # . Notice that, each tuple t p ∈ T (r # ) is associated with a non-overlapping partition in r.
T A B C D E F T A B C D E F t1 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 ⊤ a1 b1 c1 d1 ⊤ f1 t2 a1 b1 c1 d1 e2 f1 t3 a2 b1 c2 d2 e2 f1 ⊤ a2 b1 c2 d2 ⊤ f1 t4 a2 b1 c2 d2 e3 f1 t5 a2 b2 c2 d2 e1 f2 ⊤ a2 b2 ⊤ ⊤ e1 f2 t6 a2 b2 c2 d1 e1 f2 t7 a2 b2 c1 d1 e1 f2 t8 a2 b2 c1 d2 e1 f2 t9 a1 b2 c2 d1 e2 f2 ⊤ a1 b2 c2 d1 ⊤ f2 t10 a1 b2 c2 d1 e1 f2 Table 4 . Concrete Relation r and the corresponding abstract relation r 
Watermark Generation
We are interested in a watermark generation process starting from a partition
, in a relational database table . The partitioning can be seen as a virtual grouping which does not change the physical position of the tuples as described in the last section. Let the owner of the relation R possess a watermark key ℜ, which will be used in both watermark generation and detection. In addition, the key should be long enough to thwart brute force guessing attacks to the key. A cryptographic pseudo random sequence generator G is seeded with the concatenation of watermark key ℜ and the primary key r[P ] for each tuple r ∈ T (R k ), generating a sequence of numbers, through which we select a field (attribute) in A(R). A fixed number of MSBs (most significant bits) and LSBs (least significant bits) of the selected field are used for generating the watermark of that corresponding field. The reason behind it is: a small alteration in that field in R will affects the LSBs first and a major alteration will affects the MSBs, so the LSB and MSB association is able to track the changes in the actual attribute values. So here we make the watermark value as the concatenation of m number of MSBs and n number of LSBs such that m + n = 8. Our aim is to make a grey scale image as the watermark of that associated partition, so the value of each cell must belongs to [0..255] range. Formally, the watermark (grey scale image) R I k corresponding to the k th partition [R k ] is generated in Table 5 , Example 4. Let us illustrate the above algorithm for a single tuple in any hypothetical partition of a table Employee = (emp id, emp name, salary, location, position), where emp id is the primary key which is concatenated along with the private key ℜ as in line 4 in the above algorithm to select random attributes. Here (10111111, 10110101, 10010101,11110111) is the generated watermark for the tuple (Bob, 10000, London, Manager), where we consider 4 MSBs concatenated with 4 LSBs. And the attribute watermark pair looks like {⟨Bob, 10010101⟩, ⟨10000, 10111111⟩, ⟨London, 11110111⟩, ⟨M anager, 10110101⟩}. As depicted in Figure 4 . The whole process does not introduce any distortion to the original data. The use of MSB LSB combination is for thwarting potential attacks that modify the data as it simply produces an integrity certificate.
Abstraction Let us define the abstract framework behind this generation algorithm, let
Watermark Detection
A very important problem in a watermarking scheme is synchronization, that is, we must ensure, that the watermark extracted is in the same order as that generated. If synchronization is lost, even if no modifications have been made, the embedded watermark cannot be correctly verified. In watermark detection, the watermark key ℜ and watermark R I k are needed to check a suspicious partition R ′ k of the suspicious database relation R ′ . It is assumed that the primary key attribute has not been changed or else can be recovered. Table 6 states the watermark detection algorithm. The variable matchC counts the total number of correct matches. The authentication is checked by comparing the generated watermark bitwise. And after each match matchC is increased by 1. Finally, the total match is compared to the number of bits in the watermark image R I k associated with partition R k to check the final authentication.
Zero Distortion Authentication Watermarking (ZAW)
So far, we have a set of grey scale images corresponding to a data table R. Each gray scale image R I k (k=1 to n) is associated with n partitions R k (k=1 to n) of R. And image R I k is said to be the abstraction of partition R k . Now the authentication of database owner is necessary. We employ the zero-distortion authentication watermarking (ZAW) [19] to authenticate the table which introduces no artifact at all.
Without loss of generality we assume that the table R is fragmented into n independent grey scale images R An equivalent image can be derived from π k using Myrvold and Ruskey's linear permutation ranking algorithm [21] by permuting the partitions in R I . The algorithm unrank makes a permutation of the segments based on a secret number (M ) only known to the database owner and this number can be considered as a private key of the owner. The owner can distribute the number of partitions n as public key. In Table 7 the unrank algorithm can be treated as the encryption algorithm based on the private key M , whereas the algorithm rank can be treated as the decryption algorithm based on the public key n.
Robustness
We analyze the robustness of our scheme by Bernoulli trials and binomial probability. Repeated independent trials in which there can be only two outcomes are called Bernoulli trials in honor of James Bernoulli (1654-1705).The probability that the outcome of an experiment that consists of n Bernoulli trials has k successes and n − k failures is given by the binomial distribution
where the probability of success on an individual trial is given by p. The probability of having at least k successes in n trials, the cumulative binomial probability, can be written as
We will discuss our robustness condition based on two parameters false hit and false miss.
False Hit
False hit is the probability of a valid watermark being detected from nonwatermarked data. The lower the false hit, the better the robustness.
When the watermark detection is applied to non-watermarked data, each ⟨M SB m |LSB n ⟩ association (grey scale entry) has the probability 
both have same number of tuples, attributes and same primary keys, respectively. Let ω = |A(R k )| * (m + n) * |T (R k )| is the size of the watermark. The false hit is the probability that at least 1 T portion of ω can be detected from the non-watermarked data by sheer chance. When T is the watermark detection parameter. It is used as a tradeoff between false hit and false miss. Increasing T will make the robustness better in terms of false hit. Therefore, the false hit F h can be written as
False Miss
False miss is the probability of not detecting a valid watermark from watermarked data that has been modified in typical attacks. The less the false miss, the better the robustness.
Subset Deletion Attack
For tuple deletion and attribute deletion, the ⟨M SB m |LSB n ⟩ association in the deleted tuples or attributes will not be detected in watermark detection; however, the other tuples or attributes will not be affected. Therefore, all detected bit strings will match their counterparts in the watermark, and the false miss is zero.
Subset Addition Attack
Suppose an attacker inserts ς new tuples to replace ς watermarked tuples with their primary key values unchanged. For watermark detection to return a false answer, at least 1 T bit strings of those newly added tuples (which consists of vς ⟨M SB m |LSB n ⟩) must not match their counterparts in the watermark (which consists of ω bits). also in this case T is the watermark detection parameter, used as a tradeoff between false hit and false miss. Increasing T will make the robustness worse in terms of false miss. Therefore, the false miss F m for inserting ς tuples can be written as
The formulae F h and F m together, give us a measure of the robustness of the watermark.
Conclusions
As a conclusion, let us stress the main features of the watermark technique presented in this paper -It does not depend on any particular type of attributes (categorical, numerical); -It ensures both authentication and integrity.
-As it is partition based, we are able to detect and locate modifications as we can trace the group which is possibly affected when a tuple t m is tampered; -Neither watermark generation nor detection depends on any correlation or costly sorting among data items. Each tuple in a table is independently processed; therefore, the scheme is particularly efficient for tuple oriented database operations; -It does not modify any database item; therefore it is distortion free. -This watermarking process has an advantage over hash function, as it does not depend on the ordering of the tuples.
